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ANTITRUST INJUNCTIONS: A
FLEXIBLE PRIVATE REMEDY
EVERETTE MACINTYRE*
The cost and time required by a treble damage action have tra-
ditionally acted as a strong brake to private antitrust enforcement.
The author urges consideration by a potential litigant faced with
this problem of the advantages of seeking injunctive relief, rather
than treble damages; and he points out the special utility of the
preliminary injunction. He also proposes some controversial and
important possible uses of prior government action in preliminary
injunction proceedings.
c UPPLEMENTARY enforcement of antitrust law by private litigants
is an integral part of the over-all antitrust scheme established by
Congress. Despite this congressional encouragement, however, the
private segment of antitrust policy was largely dormant until after
World War II: in the half century from the Sherman Act's1 passage
until 1941, only 175 cases had been filed and of these only 13 had re-
sulted in judgment for the plaintiff.2 Thus, private suits were of com-
paratively little significance in the over-all antitrust scheme, especially
when measured against the nation's large number of businessmen and
the extent of corporate consolidations in the last fifty years. After
World War II, however, the private antitrust litigant began to
assume importance. Today, private enforcement is a widely-known
and widely-used procedure, and most lawyers and businessmen are
fully cognizant of its effectiveness. But even today, most private
litigation involves an attempt to obtain treble damages, and private
thinking seems to have become channeled along that line. This is
unfortunate, for the availability of injunctive relief, either alone or
combined with an action for treble damages, offers the private liti-
gant a most flexible and valuable remedy against existing or threat-
ened antitrust violations.
*A.B. 1926, University of North Carolina; LL.B. 1929, George Washington Uni-
versity. Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission.
226 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
2 ATr'y. GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 378 (1955).
ANTITRUST INJUNCTIONS
I
PROVISIONS IN THE LAW FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
There are two independent sources of judicial power for grant-
ing injunctive relief in antitrust cases. One source is the specific
jurisdiction given to the federal courts to prevent and restrain anti-
trust violations by section 4 of the Sherman Act3 and section 15 of
the Clayton Act.4 These two sections also place an affirmative duty
on the several district attorneys of the United States to institute pro-
ceedings in equity to enforce the acts. When the Government ful-
fills this duty by restraining antitrust violations, benefits naturally
inure to injured third parties, and the relief granted in such situa-
situations is as effective as if granted in private litigation.
But the private party, whether he be a small businessman or a
large one, also may seek an injunction to prevent or restrain anti-
trust violations, 5 either where the Government has failed to do
so or where the relief obtained by the Government is insufficient to
supply him with adequate protection. The right of a federal court
to grant injunctive relief in a private antitrust action is derived
from section 16 of the Clayton Act, which provides in-part that
any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief.., against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws ... when and under the same conditions and prin-
ciples as injunctive relief ... is granted by courts of equity .... 6
The granting of this injunctive power by the statutes, however,
should not cloud the existence of a second and independent source
of authority for injunctive relief: the general equity powers con-
ferred on the federal courts by article III, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion. The discretionary power of a federal court sitting in equity to
apply a specific remedy is derived from the equity powers which
existed in the High Court of Chancery in England in 1789.7
'26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C., § 4 (1964).
38 Stat. 736 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C., § 25 (1964).
See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,-259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Bigelow
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 162 F.2d 520, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947);
McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
a 38 Stat. 737 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
7 Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1868); Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp.,
122 F.2d 925, 927 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942). To determine
equities and equitable rights, access must be had not only to congressional legislation
but also to the principles of equity that exist independently of and prior to con-
gressional legislation. United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 339 (1906).
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Thus, even in the absence of specific provisions establishing equity
jurisdiction," federal courts may fashion an equitable decree if
the situation warrants it.
II
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
Plaintiffs asking for relief under the antitrust laws can and some-
times do seek preliminary injunctions at the outset of the litigation.
Such injunctions may be vitally needed to prevent further serious
injury to the plaintiff pendente lite, especially since antitrust
litigation often consumes many years. Since preliminary relief, given
without a full adjudication of the dispute, is a serious remedy, the
courts have required the plaintiff to meet a difficult but not insur-
mountable burden.10 As Judge Jerome Frank stated in his often
cited Hamilton Watch Co. opinion:
To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the plain-
tiff's right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely certain,
wholly without doubt; if the other elements are present (i.e., the
balance of hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it will ordi-
narily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the
merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make
them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate in-
vestigation."
The plaintiff must ordinarily show: (1) that the conduct to be en-
joined is in furtherance of the alleged violations of the antitrust
laws; (2) that there is a substantial likelihood the allegations of the
complaint will be sustained at the trial of the cause; (3) that irrep-
arable harm to the plaintiff will result if the injunction is denied;
and (4) that the harm to the defendant likely to result if the relief is
granted does not outweigh the harm to the plaintiff if the relief is
denied.'12
SThere are situations where the specific antitrust injunctive remedies are not
available to the plaintiff. See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
9 For cases granting preliminary injunctions where the antitrust provisions were not
applicable, see text accompanying notes 54-66 infra.
10 
"The burden cast on plaintiffs.., is a heavy one and the injunction should not
be granted ... except in a case clearly demanding it." Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co.
v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed, 221
F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1955). See generally TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TR.BLE DAMAGE ANTI-
TRusT ACTIONS § 7 (1965).
11 Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953).
"See McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743, 746
(E.D. Pa. 1964).
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A. Conduct in Furtherance of Alleged Violations
Requirement (1) offers little difficulty. Except in unusual cir-
cumstances, the preliminary relief which the plaintiff desires is to
restrain the defendant from doing the very acts which are alleged to
be antitrust violations. 13 A preliminary injunction used to sequester
property as a guarantee of payment of a possible judgment against
the defendant would apparently be improper.' 4
B. Substantial Likelihood of Plaintiff's Success
Requirement (2) involves a difficult judgment by the court on
the plaintiff's chances of success in his suit on the merits. Judge
Frank's words quoted above are particularly apropos to this prob-
lem, and accentuate the difficulty involved.' 5 "The possibility
that the court may decide the right to permanent relief adversely
to plaintiff does not preclude it from granting the temporary relief."' 6
And a preliminary injunction was granted even where the court
stated that "we cannot determine at this juncture ... whether or not
... [plaintiff] is entitled to the ultimate relief which it seeks."' 7
It should not be assumed, however, that the plaintiff's burden is
light in this respect. It is often necessary for the court to make a
fairly detailed analysis of the complex economic factors typical of
antitrust cases in order to determine the probability of a viola-
tion,"'8 and the plaintiff must supply sufficient information for the
court to do so.
The plaintiff's burden of proof under a motion for preliminary
injunction generally can be satisfied by a "prima facie" showing of
an antitrust violation. In United States v. Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc.,19 for example, the defendants contended that a preliminary in-
junction could be granted only if the "court is convinced with
23 E.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953)
(defendant's stock purchases in plaintiff alleged to be in violation of Clayton Act § 7;
preliminary injunction sought to restrain such purchases); cf. Bergen Drug Co. v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962) (preliminary injunction com-
pelling defendant to continue to deal with plaintiff granted, since failure to grant
would further defendant's alleged monopoly).
"Cf. DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
See text accompanying note 11 supra.
"Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725, 727 (3d Cir. 1962); accord,
Burton v. Matanuska Valley Lines, Inc., 244 F.2d 647, 650-51 (9th Cir. 1957).
1 Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 328 F.2d 830, 831
(6th Cir. 1964).
18E.g., Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (ED. Mich.), aff'd, 280 F.2d
747 (6th Cir. 1960).
1 31 F. Supp. 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1940).
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reasonable certainty that the government will prevail." 20 However,
the court upheld the government's position that only a "prima facie
showing of the violation" 21 was necessary.
The "prima facie" idea is actually only a shorthand statement
of the rule that the plaintiff must show that he has a reasonable
chance of ultimately prevailing on the merits. This interrelation-
ship can be seen in a recent declaration by the Tenth Circuit that the
plaintiff must make out a "prima facie case showing a reasonable
probability" of success.22 Nevertheless, the concept serves a useful
purpose. Most lawyers have a feeling for what constitutes a prima
facie case, and certainly if the plaintiff is able to marshal sufficient
proof to meet this standard, he has adequately satisfied the "reason-
able probability" burden.
Statements to the effect that a preliminary injunction "does
not issue where the moving papers disclose the parties are in serious
dispute on conflicting questions of the fact and law' 23 can fre-
quently be found in the cases. It should be noted immediately that
this "rule" appears to be in conflict with Judge Frank's statement
quoted above: If the plaintiff simply "has raised ...serious, sub-
stantial, difficult and doubtful" 24 questions on the merits, an in-
junction may issue. The true relevance of this "disputed questions"
concept is merely that such a dispute bears on the issue of whether
the plaintiff has shown a reasonable probability of success. As the
reality of dispute increases, the plaintiff's showing of such a proba-
bility decreases. This distinction was clearly seen by Judge Smith
when he stated:
Although applications for preliminary injunctions are frequently
refused where the right is doubtful because of disputed questions
of fact or law, it is noted that even if there is such a conflict, if
plaintiff shows an irreparable injury will be suffered prior to the
final hearing, that there is a reasonable probability that the facts
will be established as he alleges and that the injunction will not
20 Id. at 272. (Emphasis added.)
21 Ibid. See Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 1945).
22 Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d 780, 781 (10th Cir. 1964).
23 Reynolds Int'l Pen Co. v. Eversharp, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D. Del. 1945);
accord, Makel Textiles, Inc. v. Pellon Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 71241, at 79971 (S.D.N.Y.
1964); Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 71282, at 79923-24
(E.D. Pa. 1964) (opinion by Higginbotham, J.), afJ'd, 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965);
Dallas v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 189 F. Supp. 815, 817 (D. Del. 1960).
21 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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cause great injury to the defendant, a preliminary injunction may
issue.25
A literal application of the "disputed questions" concept would
substantially destroy the efficacy of preliminary injunctions, for
antitrust litigation teaches us that defendants rarely fail to raise
substantial factual and legal issues. The concept therefore has no
validity as an independent determinant of whether an injunction
should issue. While many courts nevertheless have stated the "dis-
puted facts" concept as an unequivocal standard,26 a careful reading
of the cases will show that it is usually accompanied by a more specific
finding that irreparable damages probably will not be suffered by
the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that he
has a reasonable chance of success in the pending litigation.27
C. Irreparable Harm
Requirement (3) obligates the plaintiff to show that irreparable
injury will result if the preliminary injunction is not issued. This
is largely a question of fact to be decided in each case.28
For irreparable injury to exist, many courts have stated that it
is necessary for the plaintiff to establish that the loss or damage is
2 Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Economy Sales Co., 127 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D. Conn.
1954).2 6 E.g., Reynolds Int'l Pen Co. v. Eversharp, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D. Del.
1945): "It is the rule of this circuit and district that a preliminary injunction does not
issue where ... the parties are in serious dispute .... ." (Emphasis added.)
27 Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 922 (1962): "'The issues . .. are not susceptible of resolution at this pre-
liminary stage and.., a trial must be had .... ' 299 F.2d at 121. "The plaintiffs
have an adequate remedy at law.... The plaintiffs have failed to establish irreparable
injury .... The plaintiffs are barred by their laches ...." Ibid.
Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. 71232 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
aff'd, 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965): "Thus '. . . [w]here difficult questions -of law and fact
are in dispute it is established law . . . that a preliminary injunction will not is-
sue .... .' 1964 Trade Cas. at 79924. "[T]he failure of plaintiffs to prove irreparable
harm combined with the novel and intricate legal questions ... lead me to refrain
from granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction." Id. at 79927.
Dallas v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 189 F. Supp. 815 (D. Del. 1960): "The law of this
jurisdiction is where the paper record shows a serious dispute as to the facts the pre-
liminary injunction must be denied." Id. at 817. "For injunction process to issue
irreparable injury is essential." Ibid.
Reynolds Int'l Pen Co. v. Eversharp, Inc., supra note 26: "It is the rule . . . that
a preliminary injunction does not issue where . . . the parties are in serious dispute
on conflicting questions of fact and law." Id. at 425. "[1]t would not appear that the
refusal to grant the preliminary injunction will cause plaintiff irremediable injury."
Ibid.
"For example, "delay in filing and prosecuting the suit or delay in seeking the
injunction are factors which may be relied upon as showing lack of irreparable in-
jury." TimBimuAxE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 85.
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not capable of definite measurement; if the loss is clearly measurable
in money, it cannot be irreparable, and no injunction is needed.29
The extent of this principle is difficult to determine. At one
extreme is the situation where injury will be suffered on a fixed-
term, fixed-profit contract, and all courts would presumably apply
the principle and deny preliminary relief. At the other extreme
is the situation where some indeterminate and valuable portion of
the plaintiff's business will be seriously injured or destroyed, and
here again it would seem that all courts would apply the principle,
with the opposite result. But what of the situation where the plaintiff
will clearly be injured to some considerable extent, and yet the
loss will be capable of fairly accurate measurement? The courts
have not given a uniform answer.30 Surely no court would deny
an otherwise valid preliminary injunction in a case where the plain-
tiff is in danger of being completely forced out of business no matter
how accurately the net worth and future profits of that business
could be calculated.3 1 To do so would run counter to the over-all
29 McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743, 750 (E.D.
Pa. 1964); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Graham, 1964 Trade Cas. 71232, at 79927
(E.D. Pa. 1964), af'd, 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965); Fein v. Security Banknote Co.,
157 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods,
Inc., 111 F. Supp. 732, 735 (N.D. Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed, 221 F.2d 797 (9th Cir.
1955).
30 A preliminary injunction was granted where the plaintiff bus line alleged the
defendant bus line was unlawfully duplicating some of its routes. Burton v. Matanuska
Valley Lines, Inc., 244 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1957). Where plaintiff was the producer of a
play, with a fixed investment therein, and the defendants unlawfully forced it to
close down, a preliminary injunction was granted. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d
Cir. 1945).
But where plaintiff actors alleged defendant studios had unlawfully black-listed
them, the court said there was no proof money damages would be inadequate. Young
v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, Inc., 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 922 (1962). And since a witness had estimated the maximum loss which would
be suffered by diversion of sales to a competitor (even though the loss apparently might
be permanent, and hence difficult to estimate), the court invoked the "measurable in
money" principle. McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., supra note 29,
at 750.
Cf. Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 344 F.2d 775, 776 (3d Cir. 1965): "This
is not a case of the claimed destruction of a business enterprise containing such
speculative elements that they are not susceptible to ready ascertainment in
damages." Does this indicate that destruction of a business is incapable of
being measured in damages? Or does it indicate that only destructions having
speculative elements will result in unascertainable damages? Cf. Revere Copper
& Brass, Inc. v. Economy Sales Co., 127 F. Supp. 739, 742 (D. Conn. 1954): "Whether
damages are to be viewed by a court of equity as 'irreparable' or not depends more
upon the nature of the right which is injuriously affected than upon the pecuniary
measure of the loss suffered."
31 "To make the remedy provided by the statute effective in accomplishing what is
meant to be accomplished, we think that the [plaintiff] ... needs equity help in keep-
[Vol. 1966: 22
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policies of the antitrust laws.
In theory, the principle places the burden on the plaintiff to
show that a dollar value cannot be placed on the injury. Yet many
courts have granted preliminary injunctions with no mention of
the principle even though the facts show that a monetary value might
be placed on the injury and the plaintiff has provided no evidence
to the contrary.32 This would seem to indicate that here again the
principle is only a facet of the more general standard that the plain-
tiff must suffer irreparable harm for the injunction to issue. If a
dollar value bears on whether or not the plaintiff will be irreparably
injured, that fact will be considered, but it is not determinative in
itself.
D. Balancing the Harm to Plaintiff and Defendant
Requirement (4) necessarily involves a weighing by the court
of the inconveniences to both parties. Since the plaintiff must also
have shown that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction
is not granted, there must be serious hardship to the defendant for
the balance to be struck on his side. Where the plaintiff's action is
based on a change in the conduct of the defendant, restoration of
the former situation generally cannot cause great harm to the de-
fendant. 33 Similarly, where injunctive relief will only delay a course
of conduct of the defendant which is allegedly unlawful, the defen-
dant's side of the balance will be light.3 4 On the other hand, as the
size and economic stability of the plaintiff increases, the balance
may tend to shift more easily to the defendant. Thus, when the
Government brings the suit, a defendant who can show that he will
be seriously handicapped may be able to prevent the issuance of
preliminary relief.35
In Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Labs.,36 the
ing his business going while his legal claim is being tested. A judgment for damages
acquired years after his franchise has been taken away and his business obliterated is
small consolation. ... Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1962).
82 See cases cited in first paragraph of note 30 supra.
33E.g., Airfix Corp. of America v. Aurora Plastics Corp., 222 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Pa.
1963) (defendant, by corraling support from its competitors, accomplished a boycott
of plaintiff's products).
" E.g., Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D, Mich.), aff'd, 280
F.2d 747 (1960) (defendant preliminarily enjoined from making additional purchases
of plaintiff's stock pending outcome of FTC proceedings against defendant for Clayton
Act § 7 violation).
5 United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1940).
"207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953).
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plaintiff was a large and well-established firm and the defendant was
a newcomer in the field with a minimal share of the market. Plain-
tiff, alleging a trademark infringement, sought a preliminary in-
junction to prevent the defendant from selling its imitation product.
The defendant alleged that such an injunction would force it out
of business, and asked that it at least be allowed to continue sales
to its present customers. The court was aware that it was faced with
a difficult balancing problem, but decided that the balance tipped
toward the plaintiff because of the additional security given to the
defendant by a court-imposed bond which the plaintiff was com-
pelled to post.
Requiring a bond is authorized by section 16 of the Clayton
Act.3 7 In difficult situations such as the one above, use of a bond
may often solve the court's balancing dilemma.38
E. Effect of Prior Government Proceedings
If the private plaintiff's action was preceded by government
antitrust proceedings, the burdens of demonstrating the alleged
violations of law and of showing substantial likelihood of success in
proving the case are considerably lightened. To utilize prior govern-
ment action, a plaintiff need not rely upon section 5 (a) of the Clay-
ton Act.39 That section provides, in substance, that a final judgment
in an antitrust case brought by the government, establishing that a
defendant has violated the antitrust laws, shall be prima facie evi-
dence of a violation in a subsequent suit by a private party against
the defendant. Section 5 (a) would be pertinent if the proceeding
were a trial on the merits and if plaintiff were seeking to obtain a
final judgment-damages or a permanent injunction. However, the
37 38 Stat. 787 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
88 Requiring a bond will not be a panacea, however. Where X Corporation is
buying shares of Y Corporation in order to gain control, and a Y shareholder sues X,
alleging that such control will violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts and asking that
further purchases be enjoined, any bond which approaches the amount of potential
loss to X may be far in excess of what the shareholder will be able to underwrite.
The problems inherent in deciding how large a bond is required can be illustrated
by Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 328 F.2d 830 (6th Cir.
1964). There the plaintiff corporation was granted a preliminary injunction against
further purchases of its stock by the defendant pendente lite. Defendant had already
acquired a 30% interest in the plaintiff, valued at $3.5 million. Yet the bond required
of the plaintiff was set at only $10,000. Assuming that the defendant desired to ac-
quire only 50% of the stock and was improperly deprived of an opportunity to do so
pendente lite, the $10,000 would cover only a .43% rise in the market price of the
stock.
" 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (a) (1964).
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issue is presented in a much narrower compass; it involves the use
of a prior government decision simply as a basis for a finding by the
courts in a preliminary injunction proceeding that there is a sub-
stantial issue and a reasonable chance of success by the plaintiff.
Thus, regardless of the ultimate resolution of the current issue of
the admissibility of Federal Trade Commission proceedings as
prima facie evidence, where only a request for a preliminary in-
junction is involved, the court may make full use of proceedings
by the Federal Trade Commission as well as by the Department of
Justice, even though those proceedings have not yet been finally
adjudicated.40
There is no doubt whatever that a court can properly take
judicial notice of Federal Trade Commission opinions and findings.
The cases are legion in which the courts have taken judicial
notice of administrative orders, records, and decisions. For ex-
ample, in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co.41 the
court took judicial notice in a private antitrust action of the issuance
of an FTC cease and desist order which branded the defendant's
business practices as a violation of the Clayton Act.42
It is not merely permissible for a court to take judicial notice of
prior FTC proceedings; indeed, it is unthinkable that a court of
equity, in considering an application for temporary equitable relief
in an antitrust suit, should ignore a decision of a quasi-judicial ad-
ministrative agency of the federal government rendered in an ad-
judicatory proceeding.43 The only question open to debate is the
weight to be assigned by courts to the Federal Trade Commis-
'
0 McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743, 747-48 (E.D.
Pa. 1964).
"L150 F.2d 988, 991, 994-95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945).
'See also Simpson v. South Western R.R., 231 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 828 (1956); Colonial Airlines, Inc. v. Janas, 202 F.2d 914, 919 n.1 (2d Cir.
1953); Kirby v. Pennsylvania R.R., 188 F.2d 793, 795-96 (3d Cir. 1951); United States
v. Rice, 176 F.2d 373, 374 n.3 (3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Bradford, 160 F.2d 729,
731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 829 (1947); Fletcher v. Jones, 105 F.2d 58, 61-62
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 555 (1939); Berg v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry., 56 F.
Supp. 842, 847 (E.D. Ky. 1944).
It has been held that decisions of administrative agencies in quasi-judicial proceed-
ings are res judicata and their findings are entitled to collateral estoppel effect in
subsequent judicial proceedings. Sayger v. FCC, 312 F.2d 352, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Tomah-Mauston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 306 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Seatrain
Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v.
Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1944).
113See McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743, 747-48
(EMD. Pa. 1964).
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sion's opinions and findings in connection with a decision on pre-
liminary relief.
It is settled that a preliminary injunction may issue solely on
affidavits in a proper case.44 A fortiori, the findings of a quasi-
judicial administrative agency charged with enforcing the antitrust
laws, made after lengthy contest and after thorough consideration
of the evidence, should completely satisfy the burden imposed upon
a plaintiff in connection with a motion for provisional relief.4"
Similarly, the courts should take judicial notice in preliminary
injunction proceedings of prior court proceedings brought by the
Justice Department. In a proper case, a court should be willing to
take judicial notice even of a consent decree entered into between
the Government and a party to the present litigation. While it
is true that consent decrees often do not conclusively establish an
antitrust violation by the defendant, they may nevertheless' shed a
great deal of light on the propriety of the defendant's actions.4
Generally, however, a consent decree would not in itself completely
satisfy the preliminary injunction requirement that the plaintiff
show a reasonable probability of success in his suit on the merits.
III
SITUATIONS WHERE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF MAY BE APROPOS
Frequently the attempt to obtain injunctive relief is ancillary
to a claim for treble damages. Nevertheless, there are situa-
tions where the treble damage remedy is either ineffective or
inapplicable, and here injunctive relief may afford the plaintiff
the only possibility of protection. It is well established, of course,
that an injunction may issue even though the plaintiff has not yet
suffered an injury for which damages can be awarded.4 7
A plaintiff injured by an existing or a threatened merger in vio-
lation of section 7 of the amended Clayton Act may be unwilling to
sue for treble damages alleging such violations, when no plaintiff
" See Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 198 (9th
Cir. 1953); Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 188 F.2d 294, 298 (7th Cir. 1951); 7
MooRF, FEDERAL PRACrCE § 65.04 (8), at 1639-40.
' McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743, 747-48 (E.D.
Pa. 1964).
" See National Screen Serv. Corp. v. Poster Exch., Inc., 305 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1962),
where the court did note the existence of a consent decree and considered its bearing
on the possibility of an antitrust violation by the defendant.
47 E.g., Mid-West Theatres Co. v. Co-Operative Theatres, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 216, 224-
25 (ED. Mich. 1941).
[Vol. 1966:22
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has yet succeeded in similar actions.48 A small businessman in danger
of being acquired or otherwise injured may have a more effective
remedy through use of the injunctive power. Preliminary injunc-
tions have been granted to restrain the solicitation of proxies and
the voting of stock alleged to have been acquired in violation
of section 7.49 An injunction may also be granted to prevent further
acquisition of a plaintiff's stock pending a full hearing on the al-
leged violation.50
Situations also exist where the specific remedies given to private
plaintiffs by the antitrust laws are inapplicable. For example, where
injury is caused by a competitor's unreasonably low prices in pos-
sible violation of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act,51 private
plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of the protection of either section
4 or section 16 of the Clayton Act.62 Even in such a case, however,
a federal court should be able to use its broad general equity powers
to permanently enjoin the defendant's activities, and, upon a proper
showing of irreparable injury, to grant preliminary relief.53
Thus, in Bateman v. Ford Motor Co.54 the plaintiff, a car
dealer, sued for damages and an injunction under the "Dealer's Day
in Court Act."5' 5 He also asked for a preliminary injunction. The
district court denied the preliminary relief, finding that the statute's
provision for damages is exclusive, and hence injunctions are not
" In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964), the court held that plaintiffs could not use § 5 (a)
of the Clayton Act to establish a prima fade case for damages since the § 7
violation showed only a tendency to monopolize. See Treble Damages Under Section 7
of the Clayton Act, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., Dec. 17, 1963, p. B-1. As pointed
out in part II E of this article, the court proceedings could be used to obtain a pre-
liminary injunction.
'9 Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953); Roberts
v. Fuquay-Varina Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 608 (E.D.N.C. 1963) aff'd
in part and remanded, 332 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1964); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co.,
185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960).
50 Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 328 F.2d 830 (6th
Cir. 1964).
5149 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
2 In a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court held that § 3 was not one of the
"antitrust laws" covered by the language of §§ 4 and 16. Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958). The Senate Antitrust Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary last year considered testimony on S. 995, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), to make § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act part of the antitrust laws. BNA
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., June 1, 1965, p. A-14.
' The source of this power is discussed in text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
3' 802 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962).
70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964).
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authorized.5 6 On appeal, the plaintiff argued two grounds for al-
lowance of an injunction. First, he contended that the statute is a
supplement to the antitrust laws, and that section 16 of the Clayton
Act therefore carries over to the Dealer's Act. The court rejected
this argument, stating that the subject matter of the Clayton Act is
so different from the Dealer's Act that
it would be highly artificial to carry over the injunctive provision
of the older act to this new statute. This is exactly what the Su-
preme Court held in Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co .....
[A]ppellant has no right to an injunction based on section 16 of
the Clayton Act.57
The second ground for an injunction argued by plaintiff was
that the court should exercise its general equity powers to make
more effective the relief provided in the statute. The court found
that it did have such powers and that an injunction should issue
under the circumstances. The court stated:
This general equitable power of the court to give injunctive
relief to make more effective a remedy provided by law is long es-
tablished and well known....
... In any event, the bare fact that Congress by statute has
provided a right at law without express provision for injunctive
relief does not preclude the exercise of the general powers of a
court of equity.58
The existence of equity power outside the scope of section 16
has been utilized by antitrust plaintiffs to obtain injunctions re-
quiring defendants to continue to deal with the plaintiffs during
16 Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 302 F.2d 63
(3d Cir. 1962).
'I 302 F.2d at 65.
r8 Id. at 66.
"It may be conceded that the legislative history gives no indication that the subject
of supplemental equitable relief was considered. That fact, to our minds, does not
advance the ball in either direction. We know that the judicial power of the United
States applies to all cases 'in Law and Equity.' Article III, section 2 of the Constitution
so says. From the very beginning of equity one of the bases of action by the chan-
cellor was to make effective the rights which the law gave a party. The purpose
of the statute here in question, as its title says, was to balance the power 'now heavily
weighted in favor of automobile manufacturers.' To make the remedy provided by
the statute effective in accomplishing what is meant to be accomplished, we think that
the dealer needs equity help in keeping his business going while his legal claim is
being tested. A judgment for damages acquired years after his franchise has been
taken away and his business obliterated is small consolation to one who, as here, has
had a Ford franchise since 1933." Ibid. (Footnotes omitted.)
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the pendency of litigation. 59 In two virtually indistinguishable
recent cases, the Third Circuit granted and the Second Circuit
denied preliminary injunctions in refusal-to-deal situations. 0 But
in both cases "the reviewing court acknowledged that federal courts
possess inherent equitable power to compel continuation of business
dealings while private antitrust litigation is pending."'"
In the Bergen Drag and House of Materials cases,0 2 plaintiffs
initiated private actions for treble damages. The defendant in each
case then notified the plaintiffs that defendant would henceforth
refuse to deal with them. Plaintiffs in each instance moved for pre-
liminary injunctions restraining defendants from these refusals to
deal. The plaintiffs contended they would suffer irreparable in-
jury and that the refusal to deal was solely a punitive measure against
them for pursuing their legal rights, and was part of a plan to deter
others from bringing similar actions.6 3
Here again is a situation which does not seem to be within
the scope of section 16. Both courts apparently thought the de-
fendants' simple refusal to deal was not in violation of any anti-
trust law.64 However, the Third Circuit in Bergen Drug found
that the refusal to deal was calculated to frustrate the litigation
and that therefore the court should exercise its general equity power
to prevent interference with the operation of the antitrust laws.
Without an injunction, the court stated, the main action could not
successfully be prosecuted since plaintiff "will be unable to secure
the cooperation of other wholesalers and of retailers to be wit-
nesses because they fear the same sort of retaliatory action that plain-
tiff has experienced."6 5 The court noted the relative burdens of the
rO E.g., McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D.
Pa. 1964).
60 Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962), reversing
1961 Trade Gas. 70151 (D.N.J. 1961) (oral opinion); House of Materials, Inc. v.
Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962), reversing P. W. Husserl, Inc. v.
Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
O"Farber, The Antitrust Treble Damage Defendant's Duty to Continue Business
Dealings with the Plaintiff Pendente Lite-A Two Case Study, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 883,
893 (1963); see Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 60, at 728; House of
Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., supra note 60, at 872.
62 Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 60; House of Materials, Inc.
v. Simplicity Pattern Co., supra note 60.
03 Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 60, at 726; House of Materials,
Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., supra note 60, at 868-69.
0" Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 60, at 728, Comment, 42 NEB.
L. REv. 825, 846 (1963); House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., supra note
60, at 870, 871-72.
Or Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 60, at 728.
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parties and found little inconvenience to the defendant and irrep-
arable harm to the plaintiff.6
This is clearly a sound result. The injunction is not of a per-
manent nature, and the defendant can always show justification for
the refusal to deal. Thus, a preliminary injunction compelling a
defendant to deal until the economic motive of deterring private
treble damage actions is gone, should be allowed upon a showing
that (1) the sole purpose of the refusal was to prevent legal action, 7
(2) irreparable damage will occur to the plaintiff, and (3) there is
a lack of substantial damage to the defendant.68
IV
SCOPE OF INJUNCTIONS
In addition to the application of injunctive relief to areas of
antitrust or related injury where the treble damage remedy would
be insufficient or inapplicable, the flexibility and breadth of a
court's injunction may offer further advantages to an aggrieved
party.6 9 A court may tailor its preliminary or permanent injunction
to meet a wide variety of competitive conditions.
A. Preliminary Injunctions
It is generally stated that a preliminary injunction "will not
issue except to prevent a change or threatened change in the status
quo pending determination on the merits."70 Where, for example,
the plaintiff was attacking a merger which had already taken place,
06 Ibid.
67 The plaintiff can, of course, satisfy this burden by inferential proof. For ex-
ample, in Bergen, plaintiff showed it had dealt in substantial quantities with de-
fendant for a number of years, and that defendant had not refused to sell to other
wholesalers. Ibid.
OsNo showing that plaintiff has a reasonable chance of success in the suit on the
merits should be required here. That issue is largely irrelevant to this collateral move
by the defendant to coerce cessation of the suit. In Bergen, no mention was made of
the plaintiff's chance of success.
9 See generally Comment, 78 HARv. L. Rlv. 994 (1965). "The decision to grant
or deny relief is only one aspect of equitable discretion. The court need not decide the
case entirely for the plaintiff or entirely for the defendant; within broad limits, it is free
to accommodate the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the public by de-
vising an individually tailored remedy." Id. at 1063.
Cf. Sedler, Conditiinal, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 RUTGERS L. REV.
639 (1962).
'10 TrMBERLAK, op. cit. supra note 10, at 85. The court's power to issue a preliminary
injunction which "'compels the defendant in order to obey it, to take affirmative
action should be sparingly exercised.'" Lipp v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 188 F.
Supp. 245 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 290 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 835 (1961),
quoting Bancroft & Sons v. Shelly Knitting Mills, Inc., 268 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1959).
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preliminary relief was denied, since what the plaintiff desired was
not preservation of the status quo, but a restoration of prior condi-
tions.71 It has been pointed out, however, that:
The concept status quo lacks sufficient stability to provide a satis-
factory foundation for judicial reasoning. The better course
is to consider directly how best to preserve or create a state of
affairs in which effective relief can be awarded to either party at
the conclusion of the trial.72
Thus, "preservation of the status quo" is not an absolute limitation
on the scope of permissible injunctive relief. At least one court
has recently expressly recognized this fact. The court brushed
aside the defendant's contention that the preliminary injunction
which had been granted was unduly broad with the statement that
it was nevertheless "eminently fair to both litigants." 73
Of course the courts show reluctance to grant drastic preliminary
injunctive relief, especially where there may be possible adverse
effects on third parties.74 However, as has been pointed out above,
it is firmly established that a court of equity at least has inherent
power to require a supplier to continue to deal with a distributor
on customary terms and conditions until the merits of a dispute can
finally be adjudicated.75
Generally the courts will also be reluctant to order any sort of
affirmative relief in a preliminary proceeding. If, however, alleged
violations took place after institution of the suit, a court has manda-
tory injunctive power to order affirmative restoration of the prior
situation.76 And, where warranted, a court can order affirmative
action to protect the interests of the parties and public even where
that involves altering the situation existing before suit was brought.
7 1 Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
72 Comment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1058 (1965).
73 Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d 780, 783 (10th Cir. 1964).
71 Graves v. Cambria Steel Co., 298 Fed. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (refusal to order
dissolution of monopoly). "[I]t has come to be generally recognized that considerations
of policy are against decreeing divestiture or the complete destruction of a nationwide
business at the suit of an individual in a private action ... particular [sic] where that
would have a far-reaching and possibly adverse effect upon interests not proved to
have participated." Schrader v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 1955 Trade Cas.
68217 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (refusal to order divestiture).
7 Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962); National
Screen Serv. Corp. v. Poster Exch., 305 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1962); McKesson & Robbins,
Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Airfix Corp. v. Aurora
Plastics Corp., 222 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Greenspun v. McCarran, 105 F. Supp.
662 (D. Nev. 1952).
7' Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956).
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For example, a large oil refiner can be compelled to raise its
service station gasoline prices and maintain them at least two cents
above the prices of independent brand service stations.77 And where
local merchants have conspired with a newspaper to cancel adver-
tising in the plaintiff's competing newspaper, they may be compelled
to reinstate such advertising.7
B. Permanent Injunctions
Where a court, after a full hearing on the case, determines to
issue a permanent injunction against the defendant, it may exercise
its discretion in enjoining a wide variety of future, as well as past,
violations.79 This may include various forms of affirmative action.
Perhaps the most graphic example is found in a 1955 district court
case where the defendant movie projectionists union was found to
have unlawfully refused to exhibit a certain film. Against the de-
fendants' contention that injunctive relief in effect forced them
to work, the court pointed out that the injunction was directed
against the doing of an unlawful act, and that it was only the
effect of this order which produced the result complained of.8 0
Other examples of broad and particularized injunctions include
an order to discharge a certain employee if he engaged in specified
conduct;8 ' an injunction against cross-licensing even where the ef-
7 The court stated that it appeared that Continental was discriminating in price
by selling its "Conoco" branded gasoline at one cent above (and in some instances
at the same price or below) the price of gasoline sold under independent brands,
"while recognizing and maintaining in other areas the standard two cents differential."
The court stated that it further appeared that Continental was conspiring with its
dealers by granting discounts and rebates to price Continental's brand at the same
price as at company-owned stations. The court noted that gasoline prices were
fluctuating wildly in three Utah counties, and that plaintiff might suffer irreparable
injury if Continental's alleged price discriminations were not curtailed.
In addition to the price discrimination prohibition, Continental was forbidden to
urge its dealers to price the company's gasoline at the same level for which it is sold
by Continental through its own service stations. The company was also forbidden to
agree with its dealers, "by discounting, rebating, or subsidizing the purchase price of
'Conoco' brand gasoline or by other similar device, to fix the price of 'Conoco' brand
gasoline sold by such dealers at the same price for which similar brand gasoline is
sold by defendants through its own service stations." Frontier Ref. Co. v. Continental
Oil Co., BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REc. REP., Aug. 25, 1964, pp. A-13-14; id., Sept. 15,
1964, p. A-i (D. Utah 1964).
78 Greenspun v. McCarran, 105 F. Supp. 662 (D. Nev. 1952).
79For examples of broad permanent injunctions prohibiting Robinson-Patman
violations, see RowE, PRIcE DIScRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON PATMAN Aar 154
n.174o (Supp. 1964).
80I.P.C. Distribs., Inc. v. Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union, 132 F.
Supp. 294, 299-300 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
81 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125,
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fect was to "make it disadvantageous for the defendants ... to con-
tinue to hold their properties," thus in effect becoming a divestiture
order;8 2 a mandate to furnish to the plaintiff yearly certified public
accountant reports on the use of a certain fund and to charge speci-
fied rates for certain services; s3 and an order not to undercut plain-
tiff's prices within a 200-mile radius of the latter's location.,4
If these cases allowing broad, affirmative, mandatory relief affect-
ing both parties indicate a trend toward greater judicial flexibility
in injunctive proceedings, then it is a welcome trend. It is un-
necessary to stress that antitrust situations involve complex factors
and few black-and-white solutions. Effective and judicious use of
injunctive orders can further the policies of our antitrust laws
immeasurably, and provide the maximum safeguards for the public
interest.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing pages demonstrate that there are many situations
where injunctive relief is a valuable tool in the hands of the plaintiff.
This tool can alleviate adverse effects on the plaintiff of antitrust
litigation as well as prevent future damages before their occurrence.
A small businessman injured seriously enough to institute a com-
plex and costly treble damage action frequently does not have the
financial resources to withstand continuing illegal price wars, boy-
cotts or other antitrust violations. It would be small consolation for
such a plaintiff to receive a treble damage award many months after
he has been forced to discontinue his business. Where the violations
alleged in the complaint are likely to continue during the pendency
of the suit, a preliminary injunction may be the only practical way
to prevent further injury. The plaintiff may also utilize injunctive
relief to protect his witnesses or himself from retaliation by the de-
fendant.
Injunctions in antitrust cases can also serve the usual preventive
functions. There may be situations where, at the time the complaint
is filed, money damages suffered are slight. The purpose of a pre-
145-47 (D. Mass.), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833
(1961).
8"William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Lodw's, Inc., 1950-1951 Trade Gas. 62543,
at 63597 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
83 A. 0. Novander, Inc. v. Chapel Hill Gardens, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas, 1 69540, at
76170-71 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
84 Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 346 F.2d 661, 667 & n.8 (6th Cir.
1965).
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liminary injunction here is to prevent injury that is threatened
and likely to occur to the moving party during the pendency of the
litigation.85 The fact that the moving party may be able to show
only slight monetary loss at the time the motion is heard is irrelevant,
for it is the nature of the threatened loss that controls.86 Indeed, an
injunction may be granted where the plaintiff has not suffered any
injury giving rise to provable damages if there is a clear threat of
irreparable future injury.87
It can be concluded, therefore, that despite the many attending
difficulties, in a variety of instances injunctive relief offers an anti-
trust plaintiff the most immediate, flexible, and effective remedy.
"r Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953).
8Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Economy Sales Co., 127 F. Supp. 739 (D. Conn.
1954).
8 Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). A court may also grant an injunction to protect the
public interest even though the party bringing the action is denied damages. Mid-
West Theatres Co. v. Co-Operative Theatres, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 216, 224-25 (E.D. Mich.
1941).
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